BACKGROUND
In January of 1994, the Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued a report entitled "Management and Disposition of Excess Pu" [ 1 3 . The purpose of this study was t o evaluate disposition alternatives for management of excess plutonium resulting from disarmament activities. The treatise covered many important aspects of the Pu disposition question and with respect t o long-term management of the excess Pu stated the following: "The two most promising alternatives for achieving these aims (long-term Pu disposition) are: fabrication and use as fuel, without reprocessing, in existing or modified nuclear reactors; or vitrification in combination with high-level radioactive waste."
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A third option involving burial of Pu in deep boreholes was also mentioned for possible future consideration.
As a result of the NAS study, the vitrification option was elevated t o the same level of importance as a reactor option and listed as one of two leading preferences for ultimate disposition of weapons grade Pu.
The Savannah River Site (SRS) has been involved in vitrification of high level waste for several decades and also associated with vitrification of a variety of other types of radioactive and non-radioactive materials [2, 3] . As a result of over 20 years of vitrification experience and about 40 years of Pu handling and processing experience, the site has been requested t o provide input into this subject by several agencies, including the U.S. Department of Energy. These efforts are directed at addressing a variety of Pu disposition alternatives [4-71, including management of weapons grade
Pu and also Pu scrap, residues, etc. that currently exist throughout the DOE complex. An early summary of vitrification options as well as a recent update of the advantages of this technology are presented elsewhere [8, 9] .
POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF VITRIFICATION
There are many potential advantages assdciated with the vitrification option for longterm management of plutonium. These include the following:
Jmmediacv of Implementation:
Many experts in the field believe it is important t o act quickly t o immobilize Pu for security, safeguards, safety and environmental reasons. Because of the advanced state of the art of vitrification and as a result of the existing capabilities and experience in this area, there is no other Pu option that can be implemented as rapidly.
Flexibility:
The vitrification option provides a common technology for treatment of almost all forms of Pu. This includes not only weapons grade Pu, but also significant quantities of more complex Pu scrap and residue compositions, currently existing within the DOE community and posing additional problems.
Tech no1 oay Avail ability :
As a result of the High Level Waste program and associated waste management efforts, the techniques and procedures for vitrifying radioactive and hazardous components are mature, the equipment and facilities for immobilizing actinides are available, and waste form specifications t o assure product quality are well understood. These efforts are directly applicable t o Pu vitrification and could be "piggy-backed" upon. ..
The only waste form which has achieved a degree of national and international acceptance for immobilizing HLW is borosilicate glass. HLW glasses already contain Pu, although in small amounts. It took approximately ten years and thirty million dollars to qualify the I .
" .
SRS HLW waste glass composition. This important and necessary effort could be piggybacked upon for the Pu vitrification option.
There are many ways in which Pu can be immobilized into glass t o produce durable, safe, proliferation-resistant forms. These options depend on the degree of proliferation resistance required and are directly proportional t o the cost and complexity of the operation. For example, simply immobilizing Pu into glass can be achieved rapidly and most easily and provides the highest degree of flexibility. The Pu-glass product produced would be more proliferation resistant that Pu in its weapons form, but could be reclaimed fairly easily by those reasonably familiar with this field. The degree of proliferation resistance could be increased significantly, however, by either initially mixing the Pu directly or by remelting Pu-only glass, with fission products or existing HLW. The radiation field associated with the radioactive additives would considerably increase the difficulty in obtaining or handling this material and in subsequent transportation and reprocessing operations t o reclaim Pu. Proliferation resistance can be further enhanced by the potential size and weight of the product, chemistry of the form, and most important, by the safeguards that would be necessary for any undertaking of this type.
OVERVIEW OF A POTENTIAL Pu VITRIFICATION STRATEGY
Vitrification provides an important option to immobilize and dispose of not only weapons grade Pu, but also many other forms of Pu as well as other radionuclides of concern currently existing in weapons producing nations. Major steps involved in a Pu vitrification strategy include Pu handling and glass preparation, conversion t o melter feed, vitrification into intermediate or final Pu-glass products, interim storage of Puglass forms and final product dispositon.
A simplified flowsheet summarizing this overall vitrification strategy is shown in Figure 1 following is a brief description of each of the important phases.
The vitrification strategy applies t o Pu in metal form currently contained in weapons as well as Pu in other forms such as oxides, buttons, scrap, solutions, ash, salts, residues, etc. The other forms of Pu are contained at DOE sites including Rocky Flats, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Hanford, Argonne National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site. Preparation of these materials will involve receipt, disassembly/ separations in some cases, assaying, interim storage and pretreatment prior t o immobilization.
Conversion:
There are two major options that can be used for conversion of Pu from a metallic form t o a suitable melter feed. These include (a) oxidation-burning it t o produce plutonium oxide powder and (b) dissolution-dissolving it t o yield a plutonium acid solution.
Additional preparation involving Pu scrap and residues could be performed, depending on composition and subsequent melting characteristics. Vitrification can handle either liquid or oxide feeds.
Vitrif icatiow
A vast array of electric melting techniques have been developed for vitrification of radioactive wastes over the years and include indirect heating, joule heating, plasma and microwave vitrification. Many of these technologies and could be utilized for vitrification of Pu. The proposed strategy considers two main options for vitrification:
Direct Vltnficat ion; A direct means of vitrifying PU into glass is shown as Option A in Figure 1 . In this case, the treated Pu is melted directly with fission products such as Cs-137 or HLW to produce a highly radioactive Pu glass product. This could be accomplished in several ways and provides the most immediate highest degree of proliferation resistance. Because of the highly radioactive wastes t o be mixed with the Pu, specially contained and heavily shielded facilities would be necessary.
. . .
aed Vitnfication Amroach A two-staged vitrification option is given as . . . .
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Option B in Figure 1 . First, a Pu-only glass is produced as an interim product. This step has the advantage of being able t o be implemented very rapidly and most easily due t o the relatively low amounts of radioactivity present, resulting from the initial absence of fission products or HLW that would be added later. The production of this interim product increases the flexibility of the process in that it can be performed by the use of relatively simple equipment in gloveboxes, and the process can even be made portable, if desired. It also allows use of a wide range of different site-specific vitrification technologies that exist and are already located a t sites containing some of the waste. While the resulting Pu-only glass does not produce the most proliferation resistant glass product initially, it does provide the most flexibility. This flexibility allows interim products t o be transported t o other locations that have more highly radioactive wastes, such as HLW or selected fission products, and later be re-melted or recombined with this waste t o produce more proliferation resistant forms. Specially contained facilities and equipment similar t o the Dlrect Vitrification option would also be necessary for this final part of the operation. However, by using the staged approach, this mission involving Pu immobilization could be most easily and efficiently meshed into other existing facilities, programs and subsequent schedules t o produce an optimum use of existing resources.
An important part of the Pu vitrification strategy discussed above is that for either option, Direct or Staged Vitrification, a common final waste glass form can be produced with a composition similar t o HLW glass [ 1 1 3. The HLW glass composition has already undergone a very time consuming and expensive process t o be certified and made acceptable. A resulting Pu bearing glass can "piggy-back" on this work. The Pu glass compositions would be expected to be as good, if not better, than the already acceptable HLW glass compositions. In general, the observed "leachability" of actinides in glass matrices is significantly lower (better) than most other components found in waste glass systems. lnterim Product Storaae:
A need t o store Pu bearing glasses temporarily is important to the vitrification option. The design of the interim storage facility would depend on factors such as the composition and radioactive content of the products and the intended duration of storage before ultimate disposal. Among the most important considerations for this facility are worker radiation exposure, public and environmental protection from radiologic hazards, and material safeguards and accountability.
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Final Product DisD osltlo~:
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The reference concept for ultimate disposition of HLW glass and spent fuel is t o dispose of this material by deep burial in carefully selected geologic repositories. This is also being considered for Pu bearing glasses. A very significant challenge for any repository scenario is t o demonstrate safe and effective performance of products out t o very long time periods (1 000 t o 10,000 years, and longer). This challenge would be expected to be even more formidable for any immobilization alternative containing large amounts of Pu, due t o criticality considerations. The waste form and waste package will be designed to prevent criticality from occurring but this must be demonstrated to a very high degree in a very complex environment. While this would not be expected t o be as significant an undertaking for a "Retrievable Surface Storage Facility or RSSF", it would be expected t o take much more effort t o demonstrate in a geologic repository.
The final form and composition of Pu glass would be tailored for technical and political considerations, involving possible reuse or non-reuse by the weapons producer and for optimizing proliferation resistance, especially towards potential non-friendly nations.
VITRIFICATION FACILITIES & CAPABILITIES Vitrification of Pu Usina New Fac i1.t-I ies
One of the options being considered for immobilization of Pu is t o design new plants, buildings and equipment tailored for Pu processing. This is referred t o as the "Greenfield Option". A potential main advantage of this alternative is that facilities can be designed for optimum performance t o accomplish the mission. Main disadvantages include possible increased costs, time for implementation and the dispositon of facilities which must ultimately be decontaminated and decommissioned after completion of the campaign. 
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Five major Pu vitrification options, along with variations of most of these options, were identified using SRS facilities for this study [8] . The processing options involved three potential Pu-bearing products that could be made; Pu-only glass (interim product), Pu/Cs-137 glass (final product) or Pu/HLW glass (final product). Examples of types of relevant existing facilities which could be modified and would be important to support vitrification of plutonium include the following:
The PSF along with New Special Recovery ..
utonlum Storaae Facility (p5F are facilities that are part of the 221-F Canyon building located at SRS. This complex is shown in Figure 2 . The mission of the PSF was t o receive Pu materials from offsite that would later be processed. The building contains a fully safequarded vault for automated transport and stacking, gloveboxes for opening drums and removing and inspecting contents, and instruments for non-destructive assay and computer accountability. The facility also contains a delivery systems for later processing of materials in the adjacent facility, the New Special Recovery (NSR).
Hew Special Recovery (NSR1; The mission of the NSR was t o process plutonium from throughout the DOE complex. This includes dissolving Pu scrap, oxide or metal from various sources t o produce purified Pu metal buttons or oxide powder.
The facility contains state of the art glovebox trains (Figure 3) for feed preparation, waste handling, dissolution processes, samples and analysis, along with a supporting remote control room. This facility also contains extra room which could be outfitted with glass melters t o pursue one of the vitrification options under consideration.
-The Canvon(1 ncludina the Multi-Purrjose Processina Facility or MPPFL 22 1 -F Canyon was the world's first PUREX production plant used to dissolve natural and depleted uranium targets and t o recover the uranium and plutonium. It is a large, heavily shielded facility operated by remote means. The building has the potential of being refitted with a melter and used for vitrification in support of another vitrification option of immobilizing Pu directly with HLW or selected fission products. The MPPF is located within the facility and contains eight modules that are now being used for vitrification of Cm and Am using a bushing melter, and will also be used for vitrification and subsequent clean up of Pu scrap on site.
.. Important for DWPF options is not t o adversely affect the current, important mission of the facility. There are two primary ways that Pu vitrification could be conducted using the DWPF. First, during the scheduled melter change out of the DWPF, the facility and equipment could be modified and Pu bearing feed introduced either directly as a Pu feed or as a Pu bearing glass frit, t o produce Pu-HLW glass forms in 304L stainless steel containers. These units would be similar t o HLW glasses in canisters, 2-ft. in diameter and almost 104%. high. An important potential advantage of this option is that waste loading t o the glass could be increased by 1-2%, which would still result in a highly durable form which could immobilize SO MT of Pu as part of the HLW program, and without increasing the number of waste canisters produced. Important disadvantages of this option are that the facility is not currently designed nor approved t o handle large amounts of fissile material and t o do so, additional criticality controls would be needed. This would be expected t o be both expensive and very time consuming, and presents the potential of adversely affecting the existing HLW program.
An alternative or second main option is designed t o minimize the potential disadvantages discussed above and allow immobilization of excess Pu to be started sooner. This option involves the staged approach discussed earlier, in which a Pu-only interim glass form is first made and later, mixed with fission products or HLW t o produce a P d FP or Pu/ HLW final glass product. A means t o accomplish this task using the DWPF facility and its extensive capabilties is by the "can-in-canister" method. This involves placing cans of interim Pu-only glass produced earlier in more convenient and available facilities into a rack in HLW canisters and then pouring HLW around them in the DWPF as part of the current HLW vitrification campaign. While this option may not produce as integral a product as the direct vitrification of Pu-HLW glass, it would be expected t o produce a excellent form with a high radiation field, very heavy, cumbersome in size, and subsequently, high proliferation protection. This approach not only represents the . easiest and most rapid t o engineer, but could be the least expensive t o implement. It also represents an option of maximum flexibility that can utilize existing facilities in an efficient manner by allowing Pu immobilization t o fit into existing schedules, programs and buildings, without adversely effecting other efforts.
. . Loffler glass, the borosilicate composition discussed above, is one of the glass systems under study. This glass has been shown t o exhibit very good chemical durability. This is exemplified in Figure 5 which shows a plot of the chemical durability of several Loffler glasses made with rare earth surrogates for the actinides compared t o more common glasses of known excellent durability, i.e., fused silica and Vycor*. The addition of the various actinide surrogates appear t o have little effect on the excellent chemical durability of the Loffler glass. The durability of glasses with increasing concentrations of actual Tho2 and UO2 is summarized in Figure 6 . These data indicate that the Loffler glass is both highly compatible with actinides and extremely resistant t o aqueous attack.
SUMMARY
Vitrification is a technically viable option t o immobilize and manage Pu resulting from disarmament activities as well as a wide range of existing Pu scrap and residue -
.
compositions. A vitrification infrastructure exists from waste management programs. This includes expertise and experience, personnel, buildings, equipment and supporting capabilities, which could be used t o implement vitrification of Pu in a time expedient and cost effective manner. Glass Identification Number 
